cess, a high off-line rate of the relay node, path re-planning and other problems, the transmission efficiency of Tor anonymous network will be slow. In addition, due to continuous deepening of the traceability technology of the anonymous network, there is a must to rapidly improve the efficiency of communication and security and anonymity of the anonymous network. The initial Tor anonymous network simply forms simple anonymous transmission of the communication data through the packet encryption and decryption of the transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, the packet encryption and decryption of the relay point, and completes establishment of communication circuits through the relay point sent by the directory server and handshake authentication between the transmitting terminal and receiving terminal and the relay points. The data packets use encryption and decryption rules of the asymmetric key, and four-way handshake authentication principle of the transmitting terminal and receiving terminal and each adjacent relay point, resulting in reduction in efficiency of the data communication, so there is an urgent need to further optimize the encryption rules.
For the above problems of Tor anonymous network, this paper proposes an efficient improved model EF-TAN (Efficient Tor Anonymous Network) based on Tor anonymous network, which can not only improve the transmission efficiency, but also improve the security and anonymity of anonymous communication.
The improved anonymous network model not only has the efficiency and security of communication data transmission, but also increases the anonymity of the communication system, which can provide users with a more efficient and reliable anonymous communication service, and also meet all-round demand of the future anonymous communication.
ANALYSIS OF TOR ANONYMOUS NETWORK

Tor anonymous network communication model
The current second generation of onion anonymous network is simply referred to as Tor network, with a prototype of onion mechanism, which carries out layered security encryption and anonymity processing for the communication data through each random onion route. Tor anonymous network communication mechanism is based on the rerouting mechanism, and each communication process achieves establishment of communication circuits and transmission of anonymous communication data through three relay points.
Each relay point will process the data flow and confuse the data packet, in order to ensure removal of each data flow and relevance between the data packets, so as to achieve the requirements of anonymous communication. Tor anonymous communication network structure is shown in Figure 1 . First, the transmitting terminal transmits the communication request to Tor agency; Tor agency locally downloads a list of active onion nodes in the directory server, which includes the node status, such as IP address of node, public key, bandwidth and online time [3] , and simultaneously responds to the communication service request at the transmitting terminal. Then, Tor agency randomly selects three relay points from the list of nodes: entry relay point R1, intermediate relay point R2, and exit relay point R3 as the transmission path of anonymous communication. If the active node is closed or does not work, Tor agency will re-select three different relay points from the list of nodes, and continue to circuit with anonymous communication. The transmission mechanism is a rerouting mechanism, so each relay point will implement key negotiation with the transmitting terminal separately, and each node only needs to know the next message and carry out data transmission. As shown in Figure 1 , only the entry relay point R1 stores the path message transmitted to the transmitting terminal; the exit relay point R3 stores the path message transmitted to the receiving terminal; the intermediate relay point R2 stores the identity message of R1 and R3. Each relay point only collects the message to be delivered, but does not have too much inquiries and demands for the rest of message, thus achieving the purpose of protecting the anonymous communication process.
Then, in the transmission process, three-layer packet encryption mechanism at the transmitting terminal will be encrypted with the secret key of each relay point, and then decrypted successively in an order of exit relay point, intermediate relay point and entry relay point in the transmission process. Each relay point uses its own secret key to decrypt, and finally presents plaintext at the receiving terminal, and the communication circuit protect the data message via TLS [4] protocol.
Analysis of Tor anonymous network vulnerability
Based on the above-mentioned Tor anonymous communication process, there are many loopholes in the security and anonymity for Tor anonymous network in the packet generation, transmission and data decryption process. Its vulnerability can be reduced to three types: node vulnerability, flow vulnerability and time vulnerability.
(1) Node vulnerability Tor anonymous network node belongs to the volunteer node. Each node autonomously uploads the maximum loadable flow bandwidth value, location, active state and other accurate message. Because the node is a kind of volunteer service and has a large number, its authenticity, security and stability are not verified by the third party. When the user uses Tor anonymous communication, the transmission relay points are three random volunteer relay points. However, in the selection of the relay point, if the anonymous communication flow is too large, optimization processing will be given to the node, and the agency gives priority to select the relay point that can carry a high bandwidth value to transmit the communication data packet.
At present, most of malicious nodes basically falsely claim that they possess the load that can carries a large bandwidth, a better performance and a stronger processing capacity, and each malicious node is distributed in different jurisdictional areas of ISP (Internet service provider) [5] ; he possibility for the anonymous communication transmission to select malicious nodes greatly increases; communication data may be controlled and monitored through a variety of attack modes; ultimately, the identity relationship between both parties of anonymous communication can be analyzed faster, resulting in failure of anonymous communication network.
(2) Flow vulnerability In Tor anonymous network, each node only needs to decrypt the required content, without need to focus on the message of the entire anonymous communication circuit, thus speeding up the transmission efficiency of data flow. In addition, in order to increase non-relevance of data flow, Tor improves the packet filling and other technologies, thus achieving the non-relevance and anonymity of the data flow [5] . However, when each node decrypts the data packet, Tor only decrypts the onion layer, rather than integrity detection of the data packet, or supervision of message integrity of transmission data, so that the data flow easily suffers from threat of active attack, such as tampering.
Tor anonymous network directly transmits to the receiving terminal through the exit relay point, so the data packet is completely decrypted here, all onion layers are decrypted, and ultimately unencrypted plaintext is presented to the receiving terminal.
Honey pot collection is carried out for the data flow of exit node, in order to easily obtain a lot of plaintext message, and collect the communication data unlimitedly, reveal the communication data and destroy the anonymous communication process.
(3) Time vulnerability In Tor network, data has a weak protection against the time. In order to reduce the communication delay in data transmission, only the fixed data packet length transmission method is used to safeguard and analyze the characteristics of the size of data packet, without using too many data packet scrambling, discard or flow confusion and other safer anonymous conversion technologies, so that the time characteristics of the data flow are not erased in Tor anonymous communication [8] .
When the user uses Tor anonymous network, and the communication data flow passes through the entry relay point and exit relay point, the time correlation between the data packets can be analyzed as a very strong characteristic [7] . Each relay point simply queues to output the data packet during data transmission, Round-Trip Time (RTT) is composed of the circuit transmission time, terminal processing time and cache processing time of the router. When the cache queuing and processing time of the relay node are relatively fixed, the identity of both parties of communication can be found out through analysis of the communication time used for round-trip in entry and exit, ultimately resulting in failure of the anonymity of communication.
Analysis of Tor efficiency
In terms of data transmission performance, Tor anonymous network has been improved compared to the first generation of onion network. However, with the rapid development of the Internet today, the expansion of the Internet business makes the application demand for the network transmission constantly enhanced, in which the network transmission delay is one of the largest demands. At present, there are two main reasons for the lack of efficiency in Tor communication: slow time in the construction of transmission path, and complicated data packet encryption and decryption algorithm.
The construction of Tor transmission path requires each node to randomly selecting the next transmission node, in order to achieve random establishment of the transmission path to a maximum extent. In addition, in order to ensure the anonymity of data transmission, the internal algorithm of Tor network may interrupt with the former node at an interval of 10 minutes, and re-select three nodes for further data communication, so as to avoid network attacks, such as flow analysis, honey pot node and so on. TLS secure transmission protocol used in the anonymous network can preferably guarantee safe data transmission. However, when a new transmission path is established every time, the establishment of TLS connection also consumes a lot of resources and efficiency. After generation of random parameters for key exchange, strong encryption of transmission data requires a large number of operations, while each transient connection will reduce the efficiency of communication.
For the relay point, the anonymous communication network does not need to know the entire anonymous communication path, so there is no need to keep the encryption and decryption state of each relay point, including the loading of the decryption key at the onion layer in the part of the data packet header, decryption of onion with asymmetric key, packaging and transmission of the data packet via more efficient packet packaging mechanism. The next step is encryption in the local port. It is unnecessary to process en-cryption part for the nodes of intermediate transmission data, thus speeding up the path construction speed, and achieving the efficiency of anonymous communication.
AN IMPROVED ANONYMOUS NETWORK MODEL
This paper proposes an efficient improved communication model, EFTAN model based on Tor anonymous network, which can not only guarantee the security and anonymity, but also improve the transmission efficiency, and integrates the idea of RP (Rendezvous Point) in Dovetail [6] , and divides the circuits into two parts, so as to ensure that all nodes do not know the identity of communication between the transmitting terminal and receiving terminal, and increase the expandability and high applicability of the anonymous network model.
Data packet structure
In EFTAN model, the relay point needs to avoid caching of each conversational state, readily revealed secret key or routing message as much as possible. Therefore, the terminal is responsible for loading the conversational state, and then the conversational state is embedded into each data packet header. In this way, in the packet forwarding process, it can ensure that each relay point can only extract and verify its own state message, and reduce the message revealed after monitoring the relay point. Each relay point shall maintain a locally encrypted self-identifier (SID), which allows the relay point to obtain more transmission message (for example, next hops, shared key, and conversational expiration time). After loading in the data packet header, each relay point can retrieve its own SID, thus ensuring that the transmission data message is not readily missed even if there are malicious nodes in the flow. The structure of data packet in this model mainly has difference in the packet header. Compared with the original control packet and transmission packet, each packet header contains the Circuit Identifier (CircID) and Command (CMD), Conversational Expiration time (EXP), random number (RN), Collection Message (CLM) and Change Message (CM).
The data packet header contains:
(1) CircID--Circuit Identifier of Circuit; (2) CMD--Forward Command; (3) Hops--Maximum number of hops.
Circuit identifier (CircID) of anonymous communication is a unique identity message in a circuit; forwarding command (CMD) is used to represent the purpose of load on the circuit; Hops represents the maximum number of hops of relay point for the conversational flow.
Control data packet:
(1) EXP--Expiration time; (2) CLM--Collection node message; (3) SIDs--Local identity message.
The control data packet header adding EXP can make the conversational flow not transmitted or waited indefinitely on the transmission path, and when the relay point verifies EXP of each conversational flow, it is easy to discover and filter out those maliciously added data flow, so as to make the replay attach and other active attacks failure; CLM contains the public secret key switched between the transmitting terminal and each relay point S ୧ ୢ୧୰ (i is the node position, dir is the transmission direction), constantly changing temporary value N and the stored relay point SID message; SIDs contain the relay point state, public secret key S ୧ ୢ୧୰ and the next hop message R.
Transmission data packet:
(1) RN--random number of generation; (2) CM--node change message; (3) DATA--transmission communication message.
The random number (RN) in the transmission data packet header is used to encrypt and decrypt CM layer. In order to avoid intersection of RN and other conversational flow, it is necessary to constantly change RN at each hop; CM contains SID of all relay points in the path and MAC used for verification of integrity, and verification of EXP and next hop message; DATA is the communication data load message.
Establishment algorithm of anonymous communication circuit
To establish the anonymous communication circuit, there is a need to mainly collect the self-identifier (SID) of all path nodes through controlling over packet forward and backward transmission, and safely deliver SIDs to the transmitting terminal by the secret key encryption and packaging method, and also fill in MAC and EXP to verify the validity of the control packet, in order to increase the integrity and anonymity of the message. Algorithm 1 describes how the self-identifier (SID) of each node is safely and quickly added to the set of SIDs.
Step 1: initialize configuration The transmitting terminal determines the anonymous transmission path, a forward transmission path Step 2: collect SID at the transmitting terminal CLM module contains a set of temporary element y ୧ ௗ . Each y ୧
ௗ is used as a medium value for DH (Diffie-Hellman) secret key exchange between the transmitting terminal and each relay point. The relay point obtains the symmetric secret key S ୧ ୢ୧୰ shared with the receiving terminal after DH secret key exchange, and transforms the temporary value y ୧ ௗ to carry out secret key exchange with the next node. CLM contains the next hop routing message R and MAC used for verification of integrity of the packet header. Firstly, the transmitting terminal transmits the control packet, and SIDs is added as the fixed length to load the shared key S ୧ ୢ୧୰ , the maximum number of hop (Hops), routing message (R), conversational expiration time (EXP) and temporary value y ୧ ௗ in the packet header. The control packet is {CircID|Hops| EXP|Create|(MAC, R dir , y ୧ ௗ , S ୧ ୢ୧୰ )|SIDs};
Secondly, after receiving the control packet, the relay point first carries out integrity detection for the packet header, whether EXP is expired, and then tests MAC through the symmetric key S ୧ ୢ୧୰ , and also ob- Step 1: The relay point detects EXP, EXP ≤ Right time. If the conversational time is not expired, it continues, or otherwise shifting to Step 5;
Step 2: The relay point uses the symmetric key {S ୧
ୢ୧୰ } to open a layer of CLM, CLM_Open (S ୧ ୢ୧୰ )→{MAC, R, y ୧ ௗ }, carries out MAC test, continues after passing, or otherwise shifting to Step 5;
Step 3: The local identity message SID is filled in SIDs, and SIDs removes a position from the left, SIDs<<1;
Step 4: The relay point uses the local symmetric key LP ୧ to pack the header {LP ୧ |R |S ୧ |EXP}, and transforms the temporary value y ୧ ௗ → y ୧ାଵ ௗ , entering into the next-hop transmission of the contract packet via R;
Step 5: The algorithm ends.
Algorithm of anonymous communication transmission process
The transmission packet transmitted by the transmitting terminal mainly relies on the onion encryption layer of CM for data protection and transmission. Each CM allows each relay point to extract its own SID message and remove an onion layer. The data packet contains forward transmission CM f and backward transmission CM b , attached with the message of MAC, EXP and R of the check packet. Algorithm 2 details the processing steps of CM layer. Steps:
Step 1: The relay point gets the transmission packet, and uses the local symmetric key LP ୧ to open a layer of its own CM,
Step 2: The relay point detects EXP, check EXP ≤ Right time. If the conversational time is not expired, it continues, or otherwise shifting to
Step 5;
Step 3: The relay point verifies MAC; the temporary value RN changes if passes, RN→RN, or otherwise shifting to Step 5;
Step 4: The relay point enters into the next-hop transmission of the contract packet via R;
Firstly, the transmitting terminal re-sorts the collected SIDs message, selects a communication circuit, and packs the shared key, routing message R, random variable RN, integrity verification MAC and communication data DATA and transmits to the transmission packet. The transmission packet is {CircID|Hops|RN| Send|(SID, MAC, EXP, R, Onion SIDs)|DATA}; Secondly, the relay point uses the local symmetric key LP ୧ to decrypt SID of each relay point itself, which can get R dir and S ୧ ୢ୧୰ after decryption, instead of getting Onion SIDs encrypted by other relay points. It also tests the integrity of EXP and MAX of the conversational flow, and transforms the random number RN after decryption of a layer of CM onion layer, so that the next node successfully decrypts SID, and CM is encrypted after passing the transmission packet by using the random number N and shared key S ୧ ;
Finally, the communication data DATA can be obtained after removing the last layer of CM onion layer at the receiving terminal, and then the data packet is passed back via CM b , and the onion is decrypted at the transmitting terminal after a series of encryption, thus obtaining the communication data DATA.
At this time, the circuit establishment and transmis-sion function of the model are completed, and an embedded CM is added under an anonymous condition at the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal. When the convergence point RP obtains the transmission packet at the receiving terminal → n ோ , CM is decrypted, in order to obtain the circuit message at the embedded n ோ → transmitting terminal. However, the length of CM is twice the ordinary one, and increases the bandwidth consumption, thus affecting the transmission efficiency of the message.
SIMULATION TEST AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Experimental environment construction and data set
This paper uses the established simulation environment to carry out simulation communication test for Tor, EFTAN and normal IP flow. By comparing with the transmission delay of data packet, actual throughput of encrypted data flow and delay in establishment of communication circuit in three kinds of environment, and verifies the efficiency and reliability of the new model designed in this paper. The entire test environment is established through Intel DPDK platform. The platform is focused on the processing of network packets, and very friendly for the user development, so the platform can add processing interfaces of Tor and EFTAN control packet and data packet, while the symmetric passwords and asymmetric passwords are implemented by calling Intel AESNI password library. Intel TCL library is responsible for processing and management of SSL/TLS control protocol, while all node agents are realized through Python language. The platform is equipped with three Intel processors and three 10 Gb/s high-speed network cards for port packet forwarding. In the network flow of the standard 10 Gb/s WLAN transmission flow, the data flow carries out effective transmission through self-carried simulation nodes and agents. An entry is deployed in the network gateway of the lab, and an exit is deployed at the exit of the campus flow, which respectively belongs to different network segments. The relay points are respectively deployed in the laboratory platform, with a total of 100 simulation nodes, and the bandwidth of 10 Gb/s, and carry out real-time monitoring for the actual throughput and transmission delay of the flow through JDSU Internet analysis platform. The application protocol of data flow analyzed by the flow filtering for two weeks is shown in Table 1 . For the normal IP, there is only a need to carry out the stable transmission test for the fixed nodes. The definition of data packet header under three kinds of environment is shown in Table 1 . Where, r represents the length of Hops, s represents the length of symmetric element group. Hops is less than or equal to the circuit of seven AS Hops, accounting for 99%, so here s=12 Bytes, r=7. 
Performance simulation test
The system simulation test first carries out contrastive analysis of the transmission delay in Tor, EFTAN and normal IP flow. In the communication flow with the maximum throughput of 10 Gb/s, the comparison is given to the data transmission delay with the linear increase of the DATA load under the same hops, and the processing Cycles are monitored when the processor is forwarding a data packet. As shown in Figure  3 , the normal IP flow hardly changes the delay due to the increase in the amount of load data. The delay is stable at 10 2 cycles, while Tor and EFTAN will delay in linear growth with greater data; the delay is more than 10 3 cycles, and the delay of Tor is more stable than the transmission delay of EFTAN. The improved EFTAN model can increase the security and ensure the efficiency of transmission. The system further compares with the actual throughput of the normal IP flow, Tor and EFTAN model, and excludes the load of packet header from the total throughput. The actual throughput is a broad evaluation system, which is mainly used to evaluate the processing speed and network expenditure of the comparison package. Figure 4 is the relational graph of the hops and actual throughput of the model flow. The actual throughput of Tor is about 1Gb/s, while the actual throughput of EFTAN is about 2Gb/s. High Hops of transmission path means that the packet header requires to loading with a greater capacity, thus leading to the decrease of the actual throughput and increase of the transmission delay. The actual throughput of EFTAN is reduced by half of the normal IP flow, but increased compared to Tor. EFTAN reduces the transmission delay, but also increases the actual throughput, and the security and anonymity of the data transmission are guaranteed. Thus, the model succeeds in achieving the goal. The system finally tests the delay in establishment of communication circuit in Tor and EFTAN models. The circuit establishment process is divided into three parts, the first part is OR connection: mainly responsible for the communication connection between the hosts within the system based on TLS connection; the second part is the circuit connection between the relay points; the third part is AP connection: mainly responsible for searching for the appropriate circuit and transferring data connection for the client request; the fourth part is TLS protocol connection: used for protection of the data confidentiality and integrity, so the delay can be expressed as AP+Circuit+OR+TLS. Table 3 represents the average processing delay when the relay points process the control packet. As shown in Figure 5 , Tor has a lower delay at 1 AP. The delay in establishment of EFTAN model at more than 2 AP is significantly lower than that of Tor, and the delay time complexity is basically consistent with O(n) and O(n 2 ), proving the efficiency of establishment of EFTAN communication circuit. 
Model security assessment
At present, the model has relatively high security and anonymity, and can ensure the efficiency of the data transmission. Speaking from the establishment of ideal model, the malicious attacker has no chance to obtain the routing message of the model or the data message in the packet. EFTAN is based on Tor anonymous system, which adds an additional anti-attack protection besides anonymity and security of Tor, thus making up for most of the vulnerability loopholes in the original Tor system.
(1) Data transmission security. The system makes up for the loopholes of Tor in interception of the plaintext message at the receiving terminal. The receiving terminal needs to use the symmetric key and then decrypt the final communication message, and the receiving terminal does not know SIDs and other symmetric key S ୧ ୢ୧୰ , so each relay point contains the anonymous circuit message not revealed too much by the receiving terminal. The data packet embeds MAC integrity verification and conversational expiration time EXP. To modify or change the communication circuit or other attack modes [11] for the conversation flow, the relay point can easily detect and terminate the conversation. The transmission path of Tor is symmetrical, and easy to intercept the returned communication message through flow analysis, but the system supports asymmetric circuit [10] , which increases the difficulty of flow analysis, and further improves the security of data transmission.
(2) Node security. The current nodes are basically volunteer nodes. These nodes are not certified by third parties, so a lot of malicious nodes are concealed, but this model avoids attacks by malicious nodes. Each relay point can only decrypt the circuit message under SID message. Meanwhile, if they are malicious nodes, they can only be access to unimportant messages, such as next hops and packet length. When the malicious nodes carry out flow analysis, each conversation is independent and temporary, and protected by EXP and MAC, so that the efficient attack modes at the current stage, such as replay attacks, change in the conversational state are ineffective.
CONCLUSION
Based on Tor anonymous network model, this paper proposes an efficient anonymous communication system (EFTAN). After analysis of the vulnerability and efficiency of Tor anonymous network, the improved anonymous communication system solves the defi-ciency in Tor anonymous network transmission delay to a large extent, and also makes up part of loopholes in the anonymity and security. The system achieves due transmission tasks of the relay point as a transmission medium, and greatly enhances the anonymity and efficiency of the whole anonymous system, and carries out effective evaluation of the security and efficiency through the system simulation, and verifies the reliability and security of the system, which can provide communication users with more efficient, more secure and anonymous communication services.
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